Broadcast Localism and the Lessons of the Fairness Doctrine by John Samples
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
recognizes a laissez-faire policy toward speech and
the press. The Framers of the Bill of Rights wor-
ried that the self-interest of politicians fostered
suppression of speech. In contrast, some constitu-
tional theorists have argued that the Constitution
empowers, rather than restricts, the federal gov-
ernment to manage speech in order to attain the
values implicit in the First Amendment. 
The government managed broadcast speech for
some time, in part through the Fairness Doctrine,
which was said to promote balanced public debate
and “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” The
history of the Fairness Doctrine confirms the
validity of the concerns of the Framers of the First
Amendment, because federal officials and their
agents used and sought to use the Fairness Doc-
trine to silence critics of three presidencies. Broad-
casters adapted to the Fairness Doctrine by avoid-
ing controversial speech, thereby chilling public
debate on vital matters. 
The Federal Communications Commission is
proposing to manage broadcast speech by impos-
ing localism requirements, including content
requirements and advisory boards to oversee man-
aging stations. This proposal limits the editorial
independence of license holders to serve the public
interest. The history of the Fairness Doctrine sug-
gests that federal officials who make and enforce
such policies are more concerned with limiting
political debate than they are with advancing local
concerns or the public interest. Like the Fairness
Doctrine, the FCC’s localism initiative poses the
risk of restricting speech. Our unhappy experience
with the Fairness Doctrine suggests that imposing
localism mandates on broadcasters is unlikely to
serve the public interest in constitutional propriety
and uninhibited political debate.
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Introduction
The First Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution states that “Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.” The American Founders saw the
Constitution as a social contract whereby the
people delegated some of their powers to cre-
ate a government to protect their natural
rights. If the people did not delegate a power,
the government could not exercise it. The orig-
inal Constitution included no such power
over speech and the press. Hence, the federal
government could “make no law” on either
topic. The First Amendment recognized,
rather than created, this constraint on govern-
ment.1 This freedom created a press whose
reporting was independent of government
control. The First Amendment in this way rec-
ognized that laissez faire was the only legiti-
mate policy toward speech and the press. 
People who hold political power generally
do not favor a laissez faire policy toward
speech. Allowing citizens to say or print what
they wish leads to criticism of government
policies or even electoral competition for those
holding power. Governments prefer to man-
age speech both to gain consent to policies
and to avoid losing power. Officials manage
speech by prohibiting or inhibiting disfavored
ideas or arguments. Public officials rarely
overtly argue they should be given the power
to manage speech to restrict the marketplace
of ideas. Instead, advocates argue that such
control would advance important values like
the public interest or democracy—ideals that
are said to be slighted by the laissez faire
demands of the First Amendment. We should
wonder, however, if self-interested politicians
are likely to manage speech to achieve some
common purpose or ideal. Might they not
simply suppress speech to serve their own self-
interests in policy or electoral success? 
Congress and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission have long managed speech
broadcast over the public airwaves. From 1949
to 1987, the FCC enforced the Fairness Doc-
trine, which required broadcasters who pre-
sent a point of view on public matters to offer
an opportunity for a contrasting view to be
heard. By its nature, the Fairness Doctrine
compromised the editorial independence of
broadcasters. Following the 2006 and 2008
elections, several members of Congress seem
intent on reviving the Fairness Doctrine
through legislation or regulation.2 A return to
the Fairness Doctrine per se seems less likely
for the near future. Several proposed regula-
tions, however, may serve as a close substitute
for the Fairness Doctrine.3
In particular, for five years the FCC has
been investigating whether “broadcasters are
appropriately addressing the needs of their
local communities.”4 It concluded that the
responsiveness of broadcasters has been less
than ideal, and that FCC policies should
change to foster more responsiveness to local
audiences. To improve licensees’ performance,
the FCC has proposed that they should be
required to meet quarterly with “a permanent
advisory board made up of officials and other
leaders from the service area of its broadcast
station.”5 It is also seriously considering re-
quiring broadcasters to devote specified
amounts of time to local programming.6
These “localism” mandates are similar to
the Fairness Doctrine in three ways. First, advo-
cates see both policies as solutions to the same
“problem”: the alleged domination of broad-
casting by a single point of view—political con-
servatism. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson com-
plain that without a fairness mandate “the
airwaves are now flooded with highly partisan
statements on matters of national importance,
much of it voicing an avowedly right-of-center
view” [emphasis added].7 Similarly, a recent
study of talk radio by the Center for American
Progress concludes that conservatives domi-
nate the format. In response, the authors call
for “steps to increase localism and diversify
radio station ownership to better meet local
and community needs.”8 Second, both policies
compromise the editorial independence of
broadcasters to attain their goals. The Fairness
Doctrine placed editorial judgment under the
influence of the FCC, while localism seeks to
make broadcasters accountable to local adviso-
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ry boards. Third, both policies assume that
broadcasters responding to market signals will
not satisfy the public’s desire for “fairness” or
“localism” without government intervention. 
But localism and the Fairness Doctrine
differ in one important respect. The FCC
enforced the Fairness Doctrine for almost 40
years, a history that informs how the policy
actually worked in practice. Mandated local-
ism for broadcasters has not yet been
enforced by the agency.9 Given the similari-
ties of the two policies, an assessment of the
theory and practice of the Fairness Doctrine
may provide some insight into likely conse-
quences of adopting broadcast localism. 
The Theory of
Managed Speech
The systematic management of speech by
the federal government began during the early
days of radio in the 1920s. As the market for
radio developed and the number of stations
increased, interference among radio transmis-
sions became more and more of a problem.
After some debate, Congress enacted the
Radio Act of 1927, which created the Federal
Radio Commission, an independent agency
with the authority to license radio stations.
Sections 18 and 29 of the law denied the new
agency power to censor broadcasting. Those
sections also required licensees to grant equal
time to candidates for office and proscribed
obscene or profane language over the air-
waves. Section 11 of the 1927 law required the
commission to grant a license if “public con-
venience, interest, or necessity would be served
by the granting thereof.”10 Section 13 prohib-
ited the commission from licensing “any per-
son or corporation which had been found
guilty of monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize radio communication.” 
From early on, the government seized the
power to decide who would communicate in
the new medium of radio and how they would
communicate. The federal government would
manage speech in these ways to preclude inter-
ference among transmissions, prevent private
monopolies, and realize the public interest. In
1934, Congress subsumed the Radio Act into
a new communications law that also created
the Federal Communications Commission.
The earlier framework of oversight of speech
continued in the new law, thereby empower-
ing the FCC.
The FCC first set out the Fairness Doctrine
in its 1949 report on “Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees.” Congress endorsed the
doctrine 10 years later as an amendment to
section 315(a) of the Communications Act of
1934. The policy required that if a broadcaster
presents one viewpoint, it would have “to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discus-
sion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance.” When the FCC found that a
broadcaster had violated the Fairness Doc-
trine, it usually ordered the party in question
to present opposing viewpoints. If the broad-
caster refused to present another viewpoint,
the FCC had the power to revoke or deny its
license. Violating the Fairness Doctrine thus
could easily complicate continuing in the
broadcasting business.11
The Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Fairness Doctrine in 1969. In
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, Justice Byron
White’s majority opinion argued that the
scarcity of opportunities to broadcast speech
justified government regulation of speech in
the public interest. The Fairness Doctrine
essentially required broadcasters to act as
trustees for the airwaves for those who could
not gain access. To assure broadcasters met
those obligations, the FCC could force them to
air views they otherwise would avoid. To justify
such coercion, Justice White focused on the
rights of listeners and the goals of the First
Amendment as opposed to the rights of speak-
ers and the language of the Constitution:
But the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medi-
um function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. It is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the right of the
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broadcasters, which is paramount. It is
the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail, rather than to counte-
nance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself
or a private licensee. . . . It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here. That right may not consti-
tutionally be abridged either by Con-
gress or by the FCC.12
The FCC thus has the power to manage pub-
lic debate over the airwaves in order to “pre-
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail.” Just as
the Radio Act of 1927 ostensibly precluded
censorship, Red Lion denied the FCC and the
federal government the power to monopolize
the media. 
Some scholars would develop an alterna-
tive to the laissez faire interpretation of the
First Amendment, an alternative that appears
quite similar to the Red Liondicta. They argued
that the First Amendment should be under-
stood not as a restriction on government but
rather as a way to empower government to
realize what the Red Lion Court called “the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment.”
The First Amendment, on this interpretation,
increased the power and ambit of the state
rather than limiting it.13 These theorists saw a
parallel in recent American history. Just as the
New Deal ended economic laissez faire, Red
Lion looked forward to an end of laissez faire
in speech and the press.14 Indeed, federal com-
munications law and Red Lion did end laissez
faire in broadcasting: enforcing licensing and
the Fairness Doctrine gave the federal govern-
ment, not the broadcasters, ultimate control
over the content of the relevant media. 
Managed speech advocates expected such
government oversight would realize First
Amendment values by requiring more varied
sources of political speech. Whereas before
only one voice might have been heard, the
FCC would now require two under the Fair-
ness Doctrine. The result of managed speech,
it could be argued, need not be less speech. 
But if the goal of managing speech is an
improved public debate, could the govern-
ment also restrict some speakers as a means to
that end? Normatively, the government might
limit those who are speaking “too much” or
whose publishing dominates public debate
about an issue. Such restrictions would be
affirmatively required if they were necessary to
achieve the goal of a rich public debate by end-
ing a monopoly on speaking, and perhaps
would create a more equal expression of voic-
es.15 Limiting freedom of speech then would
not be a mistake or a violation of rights. In-
stead, restrictions on speech would be needed
to serve democracy or the values underlying
the First Amendment. 
I now turn to the Fairness Doctrine in prac-
tice. Did the FCC’s management of speech
under this policy enable “an uninhibited mar-
ketplace of ideas”? Did the Fairness Doctrine
lessen speech? If so, did such restrictions make
public debates more democratic? Finally, did
the costs associated with the Fairness
Doctrine have a chilling effect on speech? 
A Brief History of
Managed Speech
Early Censorship
The Radio Act of 1927 explicitly denied that
the medium’s regulator had the power to cen-
sor broadcasts. Nonetheless, censorship hap-
pened. In 1924, H. V. Kaltenborn, a radio per-
sonality in New York, criticized Secretary of
State Charles Evans Hughes for refusing to rec-
ognize the Soviet Union. When Hughes heard
the criticism, he called a representative of
AT&T, the owner of the station, who in turn let
it be known that “this fellow Kaltenborn
should not be allowed to criticize a cabinet
member” over the radio. Kaltenborn’s contract
was cancelled. In 1926, the socialist leader
Norman Thomas had a speech prepared for
radio abruptly postponed. Thomas concluded
that no radio outlet would allow criticism of an
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administration when its license lay within the
ambit of a cabinet official. In 1933, the restric-
tions shifted to conservative critics of the New
Deal. Harold A. Lafount, the head of the Fed-
eral Radio Commission, told radio stations it
was “their patriotic, if not bound and legal
duty” to refuse broadcasting facilities to adver-
tisers who ignored or defied the industry codes
set out by the National Recovery Administra-
tion. CBS then cancelled a broadcast by a critic
of those codes.16 In 1940, the FCC granted
renewal of a radio license contingent on the sta-
tion in question abandoning editorials. Other
license holders took the lesson to heart and
stopped broadcasting editorials and started
avoiding controversial programming. The
FCC’s understanding of its mission at this time
is revealing: “Though we may not censor, it is
our duty to see that broadcast licenses do not
afford mere personal organs, and also to see
that a standard of refinement fitting our day
and generation is maintained.”17 In other
words, a station would not be permitted to
broadcast only the views of its owner and thus
become “a mere personal organ.” A broadcaster
would also be obligated to observe community
standards in regard to content and presenta-
tion. Since the FCC had adopted these stan-
dards for broadcasters and held power over
their licenses, the agency had power to discour-
age disfavored speech—a power commonly
called censorship. The management of speech
early in the history of the FCC indicates a
propensity to suppress views counter to the
views of those who hold power or contrary to
community standards, and not an effort to cre-
ate a rich public debate or an uninhibited mar-
ketplace of ideas.
The Kennedy-Johnson Gambit
The FCC adopted the Fairness Doctrine in
1949. From 1963 to 1973, three administra-
tions used the policy to harass their critics. In
1963, the Kennedy administration wished to
negotiate a limited nuclear test ban treaty with
the Soviet Union and to persuade the Senate to
ratify the agreement.18 The administration wor-
ried that conservative broadcasters might influ-
ence public opinion and thereby complicate or
preclude ratification and, more generally, their
efforts at détente. Indeed, the president himself
had said privately that the FCC and the “prop-
er” Senate committees should act against
efforts to “spread right-wing propaganda” criti-
cal of his administration.19 Members of the
administration, acting in concert with the
Democratic National Committee, set up the
Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty. This group purported to be nonparti-
san; its research, publicity, and arguments, how-
ever, were prepared by Ruder and Finn, the pub-
lic relations firm for the DNC. Each time a
conservative commentator attacked the treaty,
the Citizens Committee demanded time to
respond and followed up with their arguments
and information. The strategy was successful.
Public opinion favored the administration, and
the Senate overwhelmingly ratified the treaty in
the early fall of 1963. The Fairness Doctrine had
been successfully used to “provide support for
the president’s programs.”20
The administration and the DNC decided
to continue the attack on their conservative
critics with the help of the Fairness Doctrine.
They believed that regularly investigating and
monitoring conservative critics of the admin-
istration would diminish opposition to Ken-
nedy’s reelection and to his proposals, includ-
ing Medicare and the sale of wheat to the
Soviet Union. The campaign strategists for
Kennedy (and later Lyndon Johnson) directed
surrogates to demand time from radio and
television stations in order to respond to con-
servative broadcasts and then to threaten FCC
action if the requests were not honored. Bill
Ruder, a public relations specialist active in the
effort, later described its purpose:
Our massive strategy was to use the
Fairness Doctrine to challenge and
harass right-wing broadcasters and
hope that the challenges would be so
costly to them that they would be in-
hibited and decide it was too expensive
to continue.21
Allies of the Kennedy administration thus
saw the Fairness Doctrine as a way to sup-
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press the speech of disfavored critics of its
policies. The authors of this attack on free
speech felt justified because they were silenc-
ing “ultra-right-wing preachers who were say-
ing vicious things about Kennedy and
Johnson.”22
The Kennedy contingent was counting on
the Fairness Doctrine having a “chilling effect”
on disfavored speech. Broadcasters might con-
clude that the costs of complying with the pol-
icy were greater than the benefits of airing con-
troversial speech. The broadcaster would then
avoid that loss by simply refusing to air the
speech that might prompt accusations of im-
balance.  
The Fairness Doctrine imposed three kinds
of costs on broadcasters: transaction costs,
opportunity costs, and investment costs. When
the doctrine was enforced, license holders
might have to pay the costs of dealing with an
accusation of unbalanced coverage. David M.
Coyne describes such transaction costs in 1981
dollars: “The broadcaster must devote the time
of key personnel to the investigation of the
complaint, prepare correspondence with the
FCC, and consult attorneys both locally and in
Washington. This activity can cost a small
broadcaster $20,000 or more, and more than
$100,000 if a major network becomes in-
volved.”23 If the FCC decided against a licensee,
the broadcaster would be required to “devote
valuable air time, often at no charge to the
speaker, to the presentation of an opposing
viewpoint.” The opportunity cost of airing the
speaker would be the foregone advertising rev-
enue or perhaps the lost opportunity to air
programming favored by the license holder.24
Broadcasters also had to consider the possibil-
ity that falling short of fairness would lead to
revocation of a license or a refusal to renew a
license. Absent the license, the values of shares
in a broadcasting company would fall to zero.
To be sure, the FCC rarely revoked licenses for
failing to comply with its Fairness Doctrine.25
Yet the possibility existed, and the probability
of the loss of the license multiplied by the val-
ue of a company suggested a significant cost
on broadcasters. Of these, the Kennedy team
was banking on transaction costs and oppor-
tunity costs to restrict the speech of their oppo-
nents. 
During and shortly after the 1964 presi-
dential campaign, DNC chairman John M.
Bailey made enforcing the Fairness Doctrine a
top concern. Bailey specified 10 radio stations
that he claimed regularly ignored the Fairness
Doctrine while broadcasting criticisms of the
administration. Among Bailey’s targets were
the Manion Forum, a series of anti-commu-
nist broadcasts created by Clarence Manion,
the former dean of the law school at the
University of Notre Dame, and the broadcasts
of Billy James Hargis, a conservative minis-
ter.26 In one broadcast, Hargis raised questions
about the character of journalist and political
operative Fred J. Cook, who had written a
book attacking Barry Goldwater. At the behest
of the DNC, Cook demanded air time from
WGCB, a small station in Pennsylvania that
ran a tape of the Hargis broadcast. The station
refused, and Cook sued to force the station to
provide the time. In fact, the DNC had decid-
ed to make an example of WGCB and its own-
er, Red Lion Broadcasting, “to weaken and
intimidate right-wing broadcasters for future
elections.”27 This case led to the Red Lion deci-
sion discussed earlier. 
This Kennedy-Johnson gambit indirectly
affected political speech. Gradually, more and
more radio stations refused to carry the pro-
grams of conservative commentators like
Hargis and Clarence Manion. The stations
feared costly litigation, lost advertising rev-
enue, and faced possible fines or license sus-
pensions from the FCC.28 Journalist Fred
Friendly concluded: “This campaign in 1964
against right-wing broadcasts was at the time
considered a success by its creators.” In a report
to the Democratic National Committee, the
leaders of the campaign proudly noted: “Even
more important than the free radio time was
the effectiveness of this operation in inhibiting
the political activity of these right-wing broad-
casts [emphasis added].”29
The First Amendment problems of this
period did not stop there. The FCC did not
want to be accused of a political or partisan
bias in regulating broadcasting. After 1964,
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the agency began to grant greater discretion
to the National Association of Broadcasters
to regulate the content of their member sta-
tions’ programs. The NAB came up with a
code of ethics that included stricter regula-
tions on broadcasting personal attacks. As
applied, the code had the intentional or un-
intentional effect of discouraging the most
conservative broadcasts.30
The Nixon Effort
The Nixon administration and the televi-
sion networks had been quarreling for some
time prior to the election of 1972. The adminis-
tration looked for ways to force the networks to
provide favorable coverage. For example, during
the intense anti-war demonstrations of Oc-
tober 1969, President Nixon told his staff to
take “specific action relating to what could be
considered unfair network news coverage”—not
once, but 21 times.31 In December, after the
election, Clay T. Whitehead, the head of the
White House Office of Telecommunications
Policy, delivered a speech in Indianapolis pro-
posing changes in the Communications Act of
1934. When their licenses were up for renewal,
local stations would be required to demon-
strate that they were “substantially attuned to
the needs and interests of the community” and
had offered a reasonable opportunity for the
“presentation of conflicting views on contro-
versial issues.” Local station managers and net-
work officials would be held responsible for “all
programming, including the programs that
come from the network.” Those who did not
correct imbalances or bias in network political
coverage would be “held fully accountable at
license renewal time.” The policy would have
bite. If a station could not demonstrate mean-
ingful service to all elements of its community,
the license should be taken away by the FCC.
Along with that threat came two offers: the
license period for stations would be extended,
and challenges to license renewal would
become harder to sustain.32
Earlier in American history, it had been the
political left that had raised concerns about a
private monopoly over the airwaves. Now
Whitehead traced the problems in media bias
to “excessive concentration of control over
broadcasting,” presumably by the networks.
Such control, he argued, was as bad when it
came from New York as when exercised by
Washington. Whitehead had taken up the
anti-monopoly cause and ended up with
something like the “right to hear” interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment as articulated in
Red Lion: the purpose of the First Amendment
was to provide an audience with diverse views
by preventing monopoly control over infor-
mation, including control by private actors, in
this case network reporters thought to be on
the political left. Until this time, the Nixon
administration had opposed the Fairness
Doctrine. Now the administration saw the val-
ue in forcing broadcasters to present different
views: “The Fairness Doctrine became the
Holy Writ; and the ‘King Richard version’
called for local stations to enforce it on pain of
being put out of business if they did not.”33
The news media did not capitulate. A
Washington Post editorial captures the spirit of
the harsh response that met Whitehead’s
speech: “the administration is endangering not
simply the independence of network news
organizations, but the fundamental liberties of
the citizens of this country as well.”34 NBC
president Julian Goodman said: “Some federal
government officials are waging a continuing
campaign aimed at intimidating and discredit-
ing the news media, and the public has
expressed very little concern.” Robert G. Fich-
tenberg, chairman of the freedom of informa-
tion committee of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, called the proposed licens-
ing standards “one of the most ominous
attacks yet on the people’s right to a free flow
of information and views.”35
Following these and similar responses,
Whitehead explained that he only had
“intended to remind licensees of their respon-
sibilities to correct faults in the broadcasting
system that are not (and should not) be reach-
able by the regulatory process of govern-
ment.”36 In March 1973, the Nixon adminis-
tration introduced legislation that would
extend the term of a broadcasting license from
three to five years. Whitehead’s other propos-
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als regarding the standard for renewing licens-
es were not included in the proposed legisla-
tion nor were they mentioned again by the
administration.37
The Nixon team appeared to have lost the
battle. Did they, nonetheless, win the war?
They would have won if the media had
restrained itself after its initial resistance in
order to avoid future attacks through the
licensing process of the FCC. The Whitehead
matter quickly gave way to the rising tide of
what would become the Watergate flood.
However, during that period there is little evi-
dence that the media restrained itself for fear
of the Nixon administration. 
Other Cases
During these years, the Fairness Doctrine
collided with the First Amendment at other
times. In these cases, however, the government
did not act systematically to advance the agen-
da of a president or an administration. In the
mid-1960s the Reverend Carl McIntire, a con-
servative evangelist, tried to buy WXUR, a
radio station in Philadelphia. Many civic
groups in that city opposed his effort. The
FCC approved the transfer of the license to
McIntire but warned him to meet the obliga-
tions of the Fairness Doctrine. In fact, the con-
tent of WXUR’s broadcasts did not comport
with the Fairness Doctrine, and when WXUR
applied for renewal of its license the FCC held
hearings and decided to deny the renewal
because of the station’s violation of the
Fairness Doctrine. McIntire appealed to the
courts, lost his initial case, and was denied an
appeal to the Supreme Court. His license to
broadcast was revoked.38
In early 1974, ABC cancelled an episode of a
talk show hosted by Dick Cavett that featured
interviews with radical leaders Jerry Rubin,
Tom Hayden, and Rennie Davis. A network
executive said at the time, “Our obligation is to
inform the public fairly and in a balanced man-
ner, and the statements made on the program
could not wait two weeks for the opposing
viewpoints.” It was, protested Cavett, a “land-
mark precedent in program censorship.”39 The
reference to “our obligation” could refer to
duties voluntarily taken on by the network, but
it seems more likely that the obligation in ques-
tion grew out of the Fairness Doctrine. Ac-
cordingly, the Cavett show cancellation ap-
pears to be a result of the network’s desire to
avoid controversial programming in light of
oversight by the federal authorities.  
In the late 1970s, James Robison, a South-
ern Baptist, preached fundamentalist theology
and conservative politics on his weekly televi-
sion program, Restoration with James Robison. In
February 1979, he sharply attacked a local gay-
rights group in the Dallas–Fort Worth area,
stipulating that homosexuality was “perversion
of the highest order.” Citing the Fairness Doc-
trine, the gay community responded with a
petition to station WFAA, which carried Robi-
son’s program, WFAA, for time to respond to
his statements. Other groups attacked by Robi-
son (including the Christian Scientists and
Mormons) had successfully claimed free time
to respond. WFAA not only granted the re-
quest, but also canceled Robison’s program. It
was later reinstated, but several other stations
around the country subsequently refused to air
it.40
An FCC investigation in 1985 found that
the Fairness Doctrine had affected the strug-
gle over a California referendum about glass
recycling. The beverage industry had put
together advertising to oppose the bill in ques-
tion. The side favoring bottle recycling learned
about the planned advertisements and de-
manded response time from 500 broadcasters
in the form of twice the amount of airtime free
from any station accepting the industry’s
commercials. Two-thirds of the stations there-
after refused to run the bottle industry’s adver-
tisements.41
In several prominent cases from the 1970s,
politically active people tried to use the
Fairness Doctrine to limit the freedom of the
press, but failed. The Democratic Party sought
a right for Democrats to respond to President
Nixon’s statements on television under the
Fairness Doctrine. The Supreme Court ulti-
mately denied the plaintiffs had such a right.42
In the early 1970s, a conservative group filed a
complaint against CBS, arguing that the net-
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work had violated the Fairness Doctrine by
ignoring hawkish positions on national secu-
rity issues. The complaint was ultimately dis-
missed by both the FCC and, on appeal, by the
courts.43 I have found no evidence to suggest
the complaint changed the way that CBS
reported on national security issues. 
The End of the Fairness Doctrine
The Fairness Doctrine died in the 1980s.
Ronald Reagan had run against an overly in-
trusive federal government and, once in office,
he sought to cut back Washington’s ambit,
including governance of the airwaves. In
August 1985, the FCC published a report argu-
ing that the Fairness Doctrine did not serve the
public interest and, in fact, had a significant
chilling effect on freedom of speech. In 1987,
the agency formally repealed the Fairness
Doctrine.44 A year later the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
the FCC’s power to repeal the Fairness Doc-
trine.45
In late 1987, Congress passed legislation
to reinstate the policy, but it was vetoed by
Reagan. In the Senate, however, the bill had
received only 59 votes—8 short of the neces-
sary number to override the presidential
veto.46 The reinstatement bill was supported
by most Democrats but opposed by a major-
ity of Republicans. However, the law attract-
ed some GOP and conservative support; John
Danforth (R-MO), the ranking Republican
on the Senate Commerce Committee, spoke
in its favor.47 Conservative leader Phyllis
Schlafly, echoing the Nixon administration
15 years earlier, lamented the loss of the pol-
icy in light of what she called the “monopoly
power” of the television networks.48
In President Reagan’s veto message, he said
“This type of content-based regulation by the
federal government is, in my judgment, antag-
onistic to the freedom of expression guaran-
teed by the First Amendment.” Congress re-
lented, lacking the votes to override the veto.49
A later effort, in 1989, also failed under the
threat of a presidential veto.50
When the Clinton administration took
office, the veto threat disappeared, and many
experts thought the Fairness Doctrine would
be revived. Some in Congress were eager to
return to a regime of managed speech.
Representative Bill Hefner (D-NC), the spon-
sor of the The Fairness in Broadcasting Act of
1993, predicted that his bill would control
“TV and radio talk shows that often . . . make
inflammatory and derogatory remarks about
our public officials.”51 Talk radio hosts, how-
ever, fostered a public outcry against the pol-
icy, and Congress did nothing.52 The election
results of 1994 then precluded reinstating
the policy until the election of a Democratic
Congress in 2006 and a Democratic presi-
dent in 2008. 
Lessons for Localism
How well did the federal government man-
age speech from the 1920s to the demise of the
Fairness Doctrine in 1987? The most systemat-
ic consequences of managed speech emerged
from the early 1960s to 1973. Each administra-
tion during that era tried to use the Fairness
Doctrine to intimidate its critics. The success
of such intimidation varied with the size of its
target. Application of the Fairness Doctrine
certainly chilled the speech of politically mar-
ginal speakers like conservative anti-commu-
nist preachers and anachronistic sixties radi-
cals, but it failed to control speech when it was
used against the television networks by the
Nixon administration. Support for the Fair-
ness Doctrine often broke down along partisan
or ideological lines: liberal Democrats favored
it, whereas Republicans did not (apart from the
Nixon period). Those divisions largely remain
today. Yet the Fairness Doctrine was applied to
both parties—and to liberals as well as to con-
servatives. History provides little reason to be-
lieve that only the speech of conservatives or
Republicans will be restricted by a revived
Fairness Doctrine.
Some politicians used the Fairness Doc-
trine to systematically intimidate their critics.
The managerial interpretation of the First
Amendment—the philosophical background
for the Fairness Doctrine—promised more
speakers and no suppression of speech except
to enhance public debate. It did not deliver on
9
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that promise. Instead, political leaders man-
aged speech in order to suppress views that
they expected would complicate achieving
their political goals. 
The logic of this failure should not be sur-
prising. The managerial interpretation of the
First Amendment assumes government offi-
cials will create a rich public debate by foster-
ing more competition in the marketplace of
ideas. It assumes that public officials will seek
the public interest in proposing and imple-
menting regulations. However, more competi-
tion in the marketplace of ideas will make it
more difficult for public officials to achieve
their policy goals, as we saw in the case of
President Kennedy and the nuclear test ban
treaty. In practice, would politicians provide
the public good of more competition in polit-
ical speech, or would they follow their own self
interests in realizing their policy agendas?
Politicians face the following choice: they can
apply the Fairness Doctrine to increase speech
and thereby complicate achieving their politi-
cal goals, or they can use the policy to chill and
suppress speech criticizing their policy agen-
das. Not surprisingly, many government offi-
cials pursued the latter path by using the
Fairness Doctrine to restrict the marketplace
of ideas. Why would anyone expect another
outcome? The First Amendment restricts the
power of public officials over speech precisely
because the interests of the rulers do not coin-
cide with the interests of the governed. The
history of the Fairness Doctrine supports this
old truth about politics and speech. The word
“fairness” changed nothing. 
Nonetheless, supporters might argue that
the Fairness Doctrine policy did increase the
number of speakers on the radio and televi-
sion. If one speaker was heard, the Fairness
Doctrine required a second view. Looked at
this way, the speakers suppressed by the
Fairness Doctrine should be balanced against
the speakers required by the policy to get an
overall estimate of its effect on First Amend-
ment values. But government officials used
the Fairness Doctrine to suppress dissent
from their policies, not to achieve a “rich pub-
lic debate” about their proposals. Suppressed
speech was not an unfortunate error to be bal-
anced by the benefits of the policy; it was the
purpose of the Fairness Doctrine. In any case,
after the removal of the Fairness Doctrine,
opinion-oriented programming grew rapidly
and the number of radio talk shows increased
from 400 to more than 900.53 Similarly,
Thomas Hazlett and David Sosa found that
the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine led to
more information programming on radio sta-
tions. They found that the date associated
with a strong increase in informational for-
mats was 1987, the year the Fairness Doctrine
ended.54 This evidence suggests that the
Fairness Doctrine on the whole reduced in
general the quantity of speech on the airwaves. 
Conclusion
History suggests that the Fairness Doctrine
served as a way for presidential administra-
tions to systematically reduce or intimidate
dissent of their policies. The doctrine also hap-
hazardly restricted the speech of marginal
individuals on the left and the right. The most
frequently targeted speakers were conservative
Christian ministers with a strong hostility to
communism. The Fairness Doctrine appears
to have limited the speech and the influence of
such individuals. When applied to more estab-
lished players like the television networks, the
policy failed to silence its targets.
The current period seems similar to the
Kennedy era: a new liberal president is pushing
an ambitious agenda and fears the influence of
conservative critics. Now, as then, the presi-
dent’s political allies hope to manage speech
with the help of the FCC. Newly empowered
advisory boards could demand that license
holders broadcast critics of the president’s crit-
ics during the time set aside for local program-
ming. Should a broadcaster refuse to follow
that advice, the renewal of its license could eas-
ily come into question. After all, as members of
the advisory board might testify, the license-
holder had refused to meet the needs of its
local audience. The broadcaster might also
choose to stay on the good side of its advisory
10
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board by deciding not to air “unfair” attacks on
the president or his administration. Some may
find this scenario unlikely. But the history of
the Fairness Doctrine suggests that the word
“localism” will be defined in practice as the
“raw political advantage” of those in charge of
managing speech. 
Both the Fairness Doctrine and the local-
ism proposal share a common weakness: they
make broadcasters subservient to politics. The
Fairness Doctrine proved useful to national
administrations in pursuit of policy objectives.
Localism in practice will give power over
broadcasting to highly organized local groups
who may use that power for national or local
ends. 
The history of the Fairness Doctrine indi-
cates the wisdom of denying political leaders
the power to manage speech. Political leaders
seek to continue to hold power and to advance
their policy goals. They have little interest in
public debates about their policies or their
continuance in office. It is folly, therefore, to
give them control over political speech. It is
also folly to expect that public officials will
truly aim at fairness or localism when they do
regulate speech. Political leaders are likely to
manage speech for their own political ends
rather than the public good. Broadcast local-
ism, like the Fairness Doctrine, is likely to do
significant harm to freedom of speech. Policy-
makers who are aware of history will recall the
lessons of the Fairness Doctrine and reject
localism mandates for broadcasters. 
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